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Abstract
Although humans have inevitably interacted with both human and artificial intelligence in real life situations, it is unknown
whether the human brain engages homologous neurocognitive strategies to cope with both forms of intelligence. To
investigate this, we scanned subjects, using functional MRI, while they inferred the reasoning processes conducted by
human agents or by computers. We found that the inference of reasoning processes conducted by human agents but not
by computers induced increased activity in the precuneus but decreased activity in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex and
enhanced functional connectivity between the two brain areas. The findings provide evidence for distinct neurocognitive
strategies of taking others’ perspective and inhibiting the process referenced to the self that are specific to the
comprehension of human intelligence.
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Introduction
Since the computer system dubbed ‘‘Deep Blue’’ won the chess
game against the reigning world champion Garry Kasparov in
1996, human intelligence (HI) has been strongly challenged by
artificial intelligence (AI). The development and application of
intelligent robots has compelled humans to deal with both HI and
AI in real life situations [1] and thus provokes questions of whether
the human brain comprehends HI and AI in essentially the same
way. During the last few decades, debates among philosophers,
psychologists, and computer scientists have focused on whether HI
and AI are subserved by similar computational processes [2–4].
However, few researchers have inquired whether the human brain
employs homologous neurocognitive strategies to comprehend HI
and AI.
Primate brains primarily evolved in adaptation to social
complexity so as to interpret mental states and predict behaviors
of conspecifics [5]. Psychological and brain imaging research
suggests that humans may understand mental processes of other
individuals by simulation [6–9], which demands taking others’
perspectives [10,11] and inhibiting one’s own perspective [12,13].
However, knowing that the appropriateness and effectiveness of
computers and robots depends upon the program embedded [14],
humans, as designers and users of AI, may comprehend a robot by
analyzing its actions rather than by simulating its ‘mind’ [15]. On
these grounds, we hypothesize that taking others’ perspective and
meanwhile inhibiting the process referenced to the self character-
ize the unique neurocognitive mechanisms of understanding HI in
comparison with AI.
Because reasoning is one of the core processes of intelligence
[16,17], we test our hypothesis by examining neural substrates
involved in the comprehension of reasoning processes conducted
by human agents and by computers. We developed a paradigm to
assess whether the neural correlates of inference of other
intelligence differ as a function of the agents affording the
intelligence (human or computer). In this paradigm, subjects were
informed of the following context before the study: 4 or 5 red or
blue hats are available, and three of these hats are randomly
assigned to three agents, as illustrated in Figure 1a. Agent B is
provided with the contextual information (i.e., the number and
color of hats available) and is able to see only the hat worn by the
agent in front of him (i.e., Agent A in Figure 1a). Agent B guesses
the color of his own hat given the information available to him.
Subjects were asked to infer Agent B’s reasoning and to judge
whether Agent B is able to know the color of his own hat (a mental
inference (MI) task). To contrast the MI task related to HI versus
AI, another set of stimuli was designed in which the human agent
is replaced by a computer that is connected to a camera, which
shoots a picture of the hat in front of it (Figure 1b). Subjects were
informed that the computer uses a program to compute the color
of the hat and had to judge if the computer, which represents AI
with the ability to conduct calculation and reasoning, is able to
report the color of the hat on top itself given the information
available. The information provided to the human agent and to
the computer was identical. Moreover, the reasoning processes
conducted by the human agent and by the computer can be
formalized using the same algorithm, such that the only difference
between HI and AI is the agent affording the reasoning processes.
A between-subject design was used to avoid the interference
between different strategies applied for HI and AI. 28 subjects
were scanned, using functional magnetic resonating imaging
(fMRI), while they performed the MI task. Half of the subjects
were randomly assigned with human agent and the other half was
assigned to the computerized agent, so as to reveal the neural
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conducted by human agents and computers.
Previous research showed that taking a third-person perspective
engages the precuneus [10,11] whereas taking first-person
perspective [11] and conducting self-referential processing [9,18–
20] recruits the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC). Thus
we were particularly interested in variations of activity in the
precuneus and vMPFC in association with the inference of the
reasoning processes in HI and AI. This was examined by
contrasting the MI task with a deductive reasoning (DR) task
based on the first-person perspective, in which subjects made
inference of the color of Agent B’s hat in Figure 1a or the color of
the computer’s hat in Figure 1b. A perspective-taking (PT) task of
judging the color of the hat that Agent B can see or the camera on
the computer can shoot was used to identify the neural correlates
involved in perspective taking. A perception (PC) task of judging
the color of Agent B’s hat was used to control for low-level
perceptual processing (see Figure S1).
Materials and Methods
fMRI study
Participants. Twenty-eight native Chinese undergraduate
and graduate students participated in this study as paid volunteers.
Fourteen (6 males, 8 females; aged between 18 and 28, mean age
23.3662.87 years) were assigned with human intelligence (HI) and
fourteen (6 males, 8 females; mean age 24.1262.35 years, aged
between 19 and 26) with artificial intelligence (AI). Participants’
gender and education were matched in the two subject groups. All
participants were right-handed and had no neurological or
psychiatric history. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and were not color blind. Written informed consent was obtained
from each participant prior to scanning. This study was approved
by the Local Ethic Committee of the Department of Psychology,
Peking University.
Stimuli and Procedure. The stimulus displays were
presented through a LCD projector onto a rear-projection
screen located at a subject’s head, viewed with an angled mirror
positioning on the head-coil. Visual stimuli consisted of colorful
pictures, as illustrated in Figure S1. Each stimulus display
subtended a visual angles of 16.2613.5u (width and height) at a
viewing distance of 90 cm. Each stimulus display of human
intelligence (HI) consisted of three human agents (A, B, and C)
who stand in a queue and all face to the left or right. Participants
were informed of the following contextual information before the
scanning procedure. There are 4 or 5 red or blue hats, as those
shown above the agents in Figure S1. Agent B knows the number
and color of hats available and that three of the hats are randomly
assigned to the agents. Agent B can only see the hat worn by the
agent in front of him.
Four tasks were designed based on the stimuli (Figure S1). (1)
Perception task (PC), to identify the color of B’s hat; (2) Perspective
taking task (PT), to identify the color of the hat that B sees; (3)
Deductive reasoning task (DR), to make inference of the color of
B’s hat; (4) Mental inference task (MI), to identify whether B is able
to know the color of his own hat. The color of B’s hat was not
shown in the stimulus displays used in DR and MI tasks to make
sure that participants must use the context information to make
inference of the actual color of B’s hat or the reasoning processes
conducted by Agent B. To match the visual features of the stimuli
used in PC/PT and DR/MI tasks, the color of C’s hat was not
given in the stimulus displays used in PC and PT tasks.
All aspects of the stimuli and tasks with AI were identical to
those with HI except the following. The hats were hung on three
rods rather than human agents. In addition, participants were
informed that there is a camera installed on Rod B, which is
connected to a computer below. The camera can only a picture of
the hat in front of it. The computer can run a program to compute
the color of the hat hung on Rod B when the information it
receives from the camera and the context information are
sufficient. In the PT task, participants were instructed to identify
what color of the hat the camera shoots. In the MI task,
Figure 1. Illustration of stimuli and neural activity specific for
PC and DR tasks. (a) and (b) Illustration of stimulus displays used in
the MI and DR tasks. In this case, the human agent B and the computer
received information about the color of the hat on Agent A or Rod A.
Subjects were asked to judge if Agent B or the computer could infer or
compute the color of his own hat given the existence of one red hat
and three blue hats. (c) Activation shown in the contrast of PT vs. PC
tasks. The contrast of PT vs. PC tasks in association with the human
agent showed greater activation in the precuneus whereas the same
contrast in association with the computer showed increased activation
in the visual cortex. (d) Parameter estimates of signal intensity obtained
in the precuneus ROI. The precuneus signal intensity was significantly
greater with the human agent than with the computer. (e) Illustration of
the activation in the right intraparietal sulci shown in the contrast of DR
vs. PC tasks in association with the human agent and the computer. (f)
Parameter estimates of signal intensity obtained in the right
intraparietal ROI. The intraparietal signal intensity did not differ
between the human agent and the computer.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002797.g001
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compute the color of the hat hung on Rod B based on the
information it receives through the camera and the context
information provided in a stimulus display. The instructions in the
PC and DR tasks were identical with HI and AI stimuli.
A box-car design was used. Each task session repeated ten times
and were evenly distributed in five scans. Each task session was
preceded by an instruction of 4 s that identified the task, which
was followed by 4 trials. On each trial, a stimulus display was
presented for 3500 ms under the question and was followed by a
500 ms interval. Two task sessions were separated by a fixation
cross (0.3660.36u) of 6 s at the center of the screen. Participants
pressed one of the two buttons with the right index or middle
finger to answer the questions. The order of the tasks and the
assignment of response buttons were counterbalanced across scans
and participants.
Behavioural Data Analysis. Response accuracy and
reaction time (RT) were recorded to each task and subjected to
a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Task (MI, DR, PT,
PC) as the main effect (Figure S2). Separate t-tests were also
conducted to compare the difference in behavioural performances
between each two tasks.
fMRI Data Acquisition. Scanning was performed on a 3T
Siemens Trio system using a standard head coil at Beijing MRI
Center for Brain Research. 32 transversal slices of functional
images that covered the whole brain were acquired using a
gradient-echo echo-planar pulse sequence (64664632 matrix with
3.463.464.4-mm spatial resolution, TR=2000 ms, TE=30 ms,
FOV=220 mm, flip angle=90u). After the functional scanning,
anatomical images were obtained using a standard 3D T1-
weighted sequence (25662566176 matrix with 0.93860.93861.3-
mm spatial resolution, TR=1600 ms, TE=3.93 ms).
fMRI Data Analysis. SPM2 (the Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, UK) was used for data processing and
analysis. The blood oxygen level dependence (BOLD) functional
images were realigned to the first scan to correct for the head
movement between scans. The anatomical image was co-
registered with the mean functional image produced during the
process of realignment. All images were normalized to a
26262m m
3 Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template in
Talairach space using bilinear interpolation. Functional images
were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter with a full-width at
half maximum (FWHM) parameter for 8 mm. The image data
were modeled using a box-car function. Parameter estimates for
each condition were calculated from General Linear Model
(GLM) based on hemodynamic response funciton Contrasts were
calculated between each two conditions. Statistical effects were
first assessed in individual subjects using a fixed effect analysis.
Random effect analyses were then conducted based on statistical
parameter maps from each individual subject to allow population
inference. A one-sample t-test was applied to determine group
activation for each effect. Significant activation was identified at
the cluster level for values exceeding a P value of 0.05 (corrected
for multiple comparisons). The SPM coordinates for a standard
brain from MNI template were converted to Talairach
coordinates using a nonlinear transform method (http://www.
mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk /Imaging/mnispace.html). To compare the
neural activities with HI and AI, parameter estimates of signal
intensity were extracted from region of interests (ROIs) and
compared using two-sample t-tests. The ROI in the precuneus was
defined as a sphere with 6 mm diameter centered at the peak voxel
observed in the contrast of PT vs. PC tasks and the ROI in
vMPFC was defined as a sphere with 6 mm diameter centered at
the peak voxel of vMPFC activation (BA10, 0/49/7) associated
with self-referential processing observed in our previous research
[19,20]. The ROI in the intraparietal sulcus was defined as a
sphere with 6 mm diameter centered at the peak voxel observed in
the contrast of DR vs. PC tasks.
Psychophysiological Interaction Analysis. After we
identified the involvement of several brain areas in the MI task,
we conducted a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis [21]
to examine the covariation between the neural activities in two
brain areas. We were particularly interested in the brain areas that
showed variation of functional connectivity with the ventral medial
prefrontal cortex during the MI task. The coordinates of the peak
voxel in the cluster identified in the random effect analysis
comparing the MI task with the DR task were used to serve a
landmark for the individual seed voxels. An ROI of a sphere with
10 mm diameter in the dorsal as well as in the ventral medial
prefrontal cortex was searched around the peak voxel. The time
series of the signals of each ROI were then extracted and PPI
regressor was calculated as the element-by-element product of the
mean-corrected activity of this ROI and a vector coding for these
two differential task effects. The PPI regressor reflected the
interaction between psychological variable (e.g., MI vs. DR) and
the activation time course of the seed region (i.e., the ventral
medial prefrontal cortex). The individual contrast images
reflecting the effects of this interaction from 14 participants were
subsequently subject to a one-sample t-test. The brain regions that
showed increased functional connectivity with the seed ROI were
identified with threshold of p,0.05 (corrected) at the cluster level
in the group analysis. Parameter estimates of signal intensity were
extracted from the precuneus ROI with HI and AI stimuli and
subjected to two-sample t-tests.
Behavioral study
Participants. Thirty-two native Chinese undergraduate and
graduate students participated in this study as paid volunteers (16
males, 16 females, aged between 19–26). 16 subjects were assigned
with HI stimuli (8 males, 8 females; mean age 20.8161.80 years)
and 16 subjects with AI stimuli (8 males, 8 females; mean age
22.0662.08 years). Participants’ gender and education were
matched in the two subject groups. All participants were right-
handed and had no neurological or psychiatric history. All had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were not color blind.
None of the participants had attended the current MRI study.
This study was approved by a local ethic committee at the
Department of Psychology, Peking University.
Stimuli and Procedure. Visual stimulus of HI and AI were
identical to those used in the MRI experiment. The stimulus were
presented in the center of an 18-inch color monitor, subtended a
visual angle of 16.2613.5u (width and height) at a viewing distance
of 60 cm. Subjects performed only the mental inference task, i.e.,
to infer whether Agent B or the computer is able to report the
color of his own hat given the information available.
Each subjects participated in two blocks of 48 trials. On half of
the trials Agent B or the computer could infer the color of his own
hat (‘Yes’ response) whereas, on the other trials, Agent B or the
computer could not infer the color of his own hat (‘No’ response).
On half of the ‘No’ response trials, neither subjects nor Agent B
could infer the color of B’s hat (consistent condition). On the other
‘No’ response trials, subjects could infer the color of B’s hat but
Agent B or the computer could not (inconsistent condition). On
each trial, a stimulus display was presented until the subjects made
a response, which was followed by fixation cross with a duration
varying randomly between 750 ms and 1750 ms. Subjects
responded to each stimulus by a button press using the left and
Human/Artificial Intelligence
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to ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses was counterbalanced across subjects.
Results
The mean response accuracy across all tasks was 95.2% and
91.3% related to HI and AI stimuli, respectively. A one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of reaction times (RTs) showed a
significant main effect of Task (HI: F(3,39)=151.8, p,0.0001; AI:
F(3,39)=152.5, p,0.0001, Figure S2). Paired t-tests confirmed
that RTs to the PC task were shorter than those to the PT, DR,
and MI tasks (all p,0.002). Furthermore, RTs to the PT task were
shorter than those to the DR and MI tasks (all p,0.0001).
However, there was no significant difference in RTs between the
DR and MI tasks (p.0.05).
fMRI data analysis first identified neural correlates of perspective
taking by contrasting PT vs. PC tasks in association with HI, which
uncovered increased blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) activity
in the precuneus (Brodmman area (BA) 7, Talairach coordinates: 8/
265/51, Z=4.60, voxel number=354, and 210/260/50,
Z=4.10, voxel number=129, both p,0.05, corrected for multiple
comparisons, Figure 1c, d). However, the precuneus activation was
not observed with the PT task when assessing AI. The difference in
precuneus activation linked to PT task between HI and AI was
verified by two-sample t-tests comparing contrast values of signal
intensity in the region of interest (ROI), a sphere with a 6 mm
diameter centered at the peak voxel of the precuneus activation
(t=2.285, p=0.03). However, the PT task with AI resulted in
increased activity in the visual cortex (BA18, –6/270/2, Z=4.34,
voxel number=432, p,0.001, corrected), suggesting enhanced
visual analysis of the stimuli when dealing with AI. The contrast of
DRvs.PCtasksappliedtobothHIandAIrevealedneuralcorrelates
of deductive reasoning in bilateral intraparietal sulci (BA 7, HI:
228/252/39, Z=5.40, voxel number=1020, and 33/262/40,
Z=4.71, voxel number=1574; AI: 234/250/43, Z=5.28, voxel
number=899, and 28/256/44, Z=4.88, voxel number=785; all
p,0.001, corrected, Figure 1e, f), and the magnitudes of DR-related
parietal activities did not differ between HI and AI (t=0.007;
p=0.994). These results are consistent with previous observations
that the precuneus is involved in taking third-person perspective in
space [11] and that the posterior parietal cortex subserves mental
calculation and reasoning [22–25].
To assess whether the inference of reasoning processes of
human agents is characterized with enhanced processing of
perspective taking and inhibition of self-referential processing,
we compared signal intensity in the precuneus and vMPFC
associated with the MI and DR tasks. The ROI in the precuneus
was centered at the peak voxel observed in the contrast of PT vs.
PC tasks (BA7, 8/265/51) and the ROI in vMPFC was centered
at the peak voxel of the vMPFC activation (BA10, 0/49/7)
associated with self-referential processing observed in the previous
research [19,20]. Relative to the DR task, the inference of
reasoning processes of human agents gave rise to increased BOLD
signal intensity in the precuneus but decreased BOLD signal
intensity in vMPFC (precuneus: t=6.957, p=0.000; mPFC:
t=23.654, p=0.002, Figure 2a, b). Nevertheless, the inference
of reasoning processes of computers failed to modulate precuneus
(t=1.606, p.0.1) or vMPFC (t=20.719, p.0.4) activity relative
to the DR task. Two-sample t-tests confirmed the different
patterns of precuneus and vMPFC activations linked to the MI
task between HI and AI (precuneus: t=2.486, p=0.02; vMPFC:
t=22.897, p=0.008). Relative to the DR task, the MI task also
induced increased activity in the right intraparietal sulcus when
perceiving both HI (t=2.881, p=0.013) and AI (t=7.083,
p=0.000, Figure 2a, b). However, the parietal activity associated
with the MI task did not differ between HI and AI (two-sample t-
tests: t=20.213; p=0.834), suggesting that inference of reasoning
processes of human agents and computers engaged similarly
enhanced processes of mental calculation and reasoning.
Figure 2. Neural activity specific for the MI task. (a) Parameter
estimates of signal intensity for suprathreshold voxels from the contrast
of MI vs. DR tasks with human agents and computers; (b) T-Map
projected on a single subject anatomical structure for the contrast of MI
vs. DR tasks with HI. Activations in the precuneus and intraparietal
sulcus and deactivation in vMPFC were observed. Activation was
observed only in the intraparietal sulcus in the contrast of MI vs. DR
tasks with AI. Color bars show scales of t-values; (c) Correlation between
RT changes and the precuneus/vMPFC activity associated with the MI
task with HI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002797.g002
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of reasoning processes of human agents influences individual
behavioral performances, we calculated the correlation between
signal intensities in the precuneus and the vMPFC and the
percentage of RT change in the MI relative to DR tasks. We found
that RT variations correlated positively with precuneus signal
intensity (r=0.528, p=0.05) but correlated negatively with signal
intensity in the vMPFC (r=20.576, p=0.03, Figure 2c), suggesting
that recruitment of others’ perspective and self-inhibition results in
delayed behavioral performance in the MI task.
As taking others’ perspective requires resisting interference from
processing of stimuli from the self-perspective [12], these two
processes should coordinate inversely with each other during the
inference of reasoning processes of human agents. Indeed, we
found a significant negative correlation between the neural
activities in the precuneus and the vMPFC linked to the MI task
with HI (r=20.794, p=0.001, Figure 3a), indicating that subjects
who recruited more perspective-taking were also more likely to
inhibit self-referential processing. Because the correlation implies
the existence of functional connectivity between the two areas, we
conducted a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis [25] to
assess covariations between the neural activity in the two brain
areas. The PPI analysis confirmed enhanced functional connec-
tivity between the precuneus and vMPFC during the MI relative
to the DR task (Figure 3b). However, such enhanced functional
connectivity was evident with HI (p,0.05, corrected) but not with
AI. The difference in functional connectivity strength between the
precuneus and vMPFC was confirmed between HI and AI using
two-sample t-test (t=3.322, p=0.006, Figure 3c).
The hypothesis that the inference of reasoning processes of
human agents engages taking another’s perspective while inhib-
iting self-referential processing predicts that, relative to situations
when the information obtained from the first- and third-person
perspective is consistent, inconsistencies between the information
obtained from the first- and third-person perspective may recruit
additional neural process to overcome the conflict during the MI
task and thus slow down behavioural responses. To verify this, we
conducted an independent experiment to measure RTs in the MI
task with both HI and AI (see supplementary methods). We were
particularly interested in RTs of ‘No’ responses that could be
classified into two categories: (1) Consistent: the information
obtained from the first- and third-person perspective was
consistent and neither subjects nor Agent B could conclude the
color of B’s hat based on the contextual information; (2) Inconsistent:
the information obtained from the first- and third-person
perspective was inconsistent and subjects could conclude the color
of B’s hat but Agent B could not. If subjects took Agent B’s
perspective and inhibited their self-perspective during mental
inference, responses should be slower in the inconsistent rather
than consistent conditions. RTs in each condition for HI and AI
groups were shown in Table S1. To normalize the individual
differences of response speeds, the percentage congruency effect
((RTinconsistent2RTconsistent)/RTconsistent) was calculated to index
the RT variation between Consistent and Inconsistent conditions.
There was a significant congruency effect with HI (9.36%62.81%,
t=3.33, p=0.005), suggesting that incongruent information from
the first- and third-person perspective slowed ‘No’ responses.
However, no reliable congruency effect was observed with AI
(1.58%63.51%, t=0.216, p=0.832), indicating that incongruent
information from the first- and third-person perspective did not
affect ‘No’ response speed when subjects inferred reasoning
processes conducted by computers (Figure 4). Two-sample t-test
confirmed the difference in congruency effect between HI and AI
groups (t=2.070, p=0.047).
Discussion
From a programmer’s perspective, the same algorithm can be
used to describe the reasoning processes conducted by of both
human agents and computers. However, our fMRI results
demonstrate that the inference of reasoning processes engages
distinct neurocognitive strategies in the human brain depending
upon the agents affording the reasoning processes. Relative to
deductive reasoning based on the first-person perspective, the
inference of reasoning processes conducted by human agents was
associated with increased activity in the precuneus but decreased
activity in vMPFC. Interestingly, this pattern was not observed
during the inference of the reasoning processes conducted by
computers. Given the functional role of the precuneus in taking
others’ perspective [10,11] and of the vMPFC in self-referential
processing [9,18–20], our findings indicate that the inference of HI
is characterized by enhanced processes of taking others’ perspec-
tive and inhibiting one’s own perspective and self-referential
processing compared with the inference of AI. Additionally, the
results of the correlation analysis demonstrated that the amount of
precuneus and vMPFC activity contributed to the response speeds
of the inference of reasoning processes of human agents,
suggesting a pivotal role of perspective taking and self inhibition
in modulation of behavioral performance when interpreting HI.
Figure 3. Functional connectivity associated with the MI task.
(a) Correlation between the neural activities in the precuneus and
vMPFC during the MI task with HI; (b) The PPI analysis showed increased
functional connectivity between the precuneus and vMPFC in the MI
compared with DR tasks with HI. An ROI was defined in vMPFC and
brain areas showed correlation the vMPFC activity was searched in the
whole brain. The color bar shows scales of t-values; (c) Parameter
estimates of the functional connectivity strength. The functional
connectivity strength between the precuneus and vMPFC was stronger
with HI than AI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002797.g003
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evidence for the involvement of the precuneus in perspective
taking, consistent with previous observations [10,11]. However,
this was evident when subjects dealt with HI but not with AI.
Judging what information a computer could process through a
camera may be conducted by inspecting visual details of the
stimuli, consistent with the enhanced visual activity in the PT task
during assessment of AI. The precuneus and vMPFC activity
correlated negatively and demonstrated significant coordination as
revealed by enhanced functional connectivity between the two
substructures. This supports the idea that taking another’s
perspective and inhibiting self-perspective related to the MI task
are two processes that function in coordination [26]. Taking
others’ perspective may weaken self-referential processes and
induce decreased vMPFC activity. Interestingly, the negative
correlation and enhanced functional connectivity between the
precuneus and the vMPFC were observed during the inference of
the reasoning process associated with human agents but not with
computers, providing further evidence for the unique neurocog-
nitive strategies involved during coping with HI.
The dissimilar patterns of precuneus and vMPFC activity
associated with HI and AI could not arise from general changes of
brain activity related to arousal because other brain areas such as
the right posterior parietal cortex, which reflects the recruitment of
additional mental calculation and reasoning processes in the MI
task, showed comparable magnitudes with HI and AI. Nor could
the differential neural activity be elucidated by task difficulty,
which was well controlled as RTs to the MI and DR tasks were
comparable. The changes in the precuneus and vMPFC activity
associated with the inference of reasoning processes of human
agents showed a reverse pattern of variation and thus could not
have been induced simply by changes of baseline activity in the
default mode network since both medial frontal and parietal
regions tend to decrease their activity during cognitively
demanding tasks [27]. The precuneus activity cannot be attributed
to enhanced deductive reasoning [28] in the MI compared with
the DR task because no increased precuneus activity was observed
with AI although the task demands (e.g., complexity of reasoning)
and magnitudes of cognitive load were comparable in both HI and
AI tasks.
Our findings shed light on the social nature of neurocognitive
mechanisms underlying comprehension of HI. Taking others’
perspective and inhibiting self-referential processing may evolve to
improve efficiency and accuracy of inference of mental states of
conspecifics. In agreement with this, subjects showed higher
response accuracy in the MI task with HI than with AI (95.0% vs.
86.3%; t=3.580, p=0.002) but performed equally well with HI
and AI in the DR Task (93.1% vs. 89.0%, t=1.361, p=0.185).
Subjects did not adopt these strategies when dealing with AI
possibly because humans treat a computer as an extended part of
the self and thus do not differentiate the information perceived by
the self and the information owned by the computer. This may
then result in more errors during the inference of reasoning
processes of computers. Lack of these cognitive strategies can lead
to deficits in social interactions, such as that seen in autism [26],
where individuals demonstrate a difficulty to cope with other
humans [29] and fail to show suppressed vMPFC activity during
cognitively demanding tasks [30]. However, people with autism
enjoy interacting with computers [31] and playing with robots [1].
This may be interpreted by assuming that autistic patients do not
have to take a robot’s perspective and inhibit self-referential
processing during their interactions with robots or computers.
Previous studies of mental attribution have commonly identified
neural correlates of mental attribution by comparing two episodes
describing consecutive events, using language or cartoons [32,33].
In these studies, subjects performed a mental attribution task with
one episode but a non-mental task with the other. The contrast of
the two tasks revealed increased activity in a neural network
including the dorsal MPFC [34–36] and temporoparietal junction
[37]. The paradigm used in the current work excluded any
differences between the MI and DR tasks in the processing of
language, biological motion, and causal coherence of visual events
that are not domain specific for inference of human mental states.
The comparison between neurocognitive mechanisms engaged in
the inference of the reasoning processes of human agents and
computers helped to highlight domain-specific neurocognitive
processes related to inference of human mental processes. The
contrast of MI vs. PC tasks showed increased activation in the
dorsal MPFC when subjects dealt with both HI and AI (Figure
S3), consistent with the previous work [34–36]. However, the
dorsal MPFC activity did not differ between MI and DR tasks at
the threshold of p,0.05 (corrected for multiple comparisons),
suggesting that the dorsal MPFC activity was not specific to the
inference of human mental processes. By contrast, we showed here
that the precuneus activation, the vMPFC deactivation, and the
enhanced functional connectivity between the two brain areas
characterize the unique neurocognitive processes involved in the
inference of HI.
Our findings complement recent research on the effect of
biological agency on neural responses involved in social cognition.
Figure 4. Illustration of stimuli and behavioral results in the
independent behavioural study. (a) and (b) Illustration of stimulus
displays used in the independent behavioural study. Subjects were
asked to infer whether Agent B or the computer knows the color of his
own hat; (c) The percentage congruency effect. This was defined as the
percentage variation of reaction times in the inconsistent condition
relative to those in the consistent condition ((RTinconsistent2RTconsistent)/
RTconsistent), which was greater with HI than with AI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002797.g004
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forecasting a person’s finger movements activated a neural circuit
consisting of the MPFC, superior temporal sulcus, and Broca’s area
[38].In an ultimatum game inwhichone player decided how to split
a sum of money with another player, human subjects rejected unfair
offers from human partners at a higher rate than those made by a
computer. The behavioral difference was associated with increased
activation in bilateral anterior insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
and anterior cingulate cortex [39]. It is not surprising that human
brains utilize specific neurocognitive mechanisms to assign finger
movements and to produce emotional responses to a person relative
to a computer given that prediction of movements of body parts and
moral judgment can only be applied to human agents. The current
study extends the previous research by showing that, although HI
and AI may use the same algorithms to conduct reasoning processes,
human brains employ distinct neurocognitive strategies to deal with
the two forms of intelligence possibly because, in the human mind,
the relationship between humans (i.e., conspecifics) and the
relationsip between humans and AI (i.e., creator vs. creature) are
essentially different.
In summary, we have shown that that the inference of reasoning
processes of human agents is underpinned by a unique pattern of
neural activition including increased precuneus activity, decreased
vMPFC activity, and enhanced functional connectivity between
the two brain areas. These fMRI results lend support to the
hypothesis that comprehension of HI engages two key process, i.e.,
taking others’ perspective and inhibiting self-referential process.
These neurocognitive processes are not involved in the inference
of reasoning processes conducted by a computer, highlighting the
essential difference in neurocognitive strategies used to cope with
HI versus AI, which shed new light on future research of human-
robot interactions.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Illustration of stimuli and procedure of the fMRI
study. (a) and (b) Illustration of the stimulus displays showing
human agents or computers. Instructions for each task are shown
below each stimulus display. (c) Illustration of the block design of
the current study. Each block of 20s consisted of 4 trials preceded
by a 4s instruction. Two neighboring blocks were separated by a 6s
interval during which only a fixation cross was displayed.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002797.s001 (0.15 MB TIF)
Figure S2 Behavioral performance in the fMRI study. Reaction
times to the MI, DR, PT, and PC tasks with the human agent. (b)
Reaction times to the MI, DR, PT, and PC tasks with the
computer.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002797.s002 (0.06 MB TIF)
Figure S3 Dorsal MPFC activation in association with the MI
task linked to human and artificial intelligence. (a) The dorsal
MPFC activation shown in the contrast of MI vs. PC tasks in
association with the human agent (BA8/32, 26/14/50, Z=3.96,
voxel number=352). (b) The dorsal MPFC activation shown in
the contrast of MI vs. PC tasks in association with the computer
(BA8, 24/36/45, Z=4.60, voxel number=335).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002797.s003 (0.09 MB TIF)
Table S1 Mean RTs and response accuracy (6SD) of the
behavioral study
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002797.s004 (0.02 MB
DOC)
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